The Russian–Ukrainian war is entering its third year. In reviewing the conflict’s current development, it is important to note that Ukraine has been losing far more territory than expected in recent months. This setback is undoubtedly the result of several factors—most notably, a critical shortage of soldiers and inadequate supplies of ammunition and weapons, which in turn are partly due to waning support from Western countries. The competence of commanders and their staffs in planning and executing limited operations may also be a contributing factor. It remains difficult to determine whether the weapons and ammunition supplied met Kyiv’s quality and quantity requirements—or whether the West, in fact, had modest expectations regarding their potential to alter the course of the war in Ukraine’s favor. Overall, the conflict’s progression has tempered the West’s once optimistic view that Ukraine might seize the strategic initiative.
It appears that Russia not only consolidated its territorial gains but also intends to expand its control over eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the outcome of the current, intensely debated post-war settlement negotiations will undoubtedly be influenced by how the situation evolves—especially in the Donbas region. Initially, the Russian command’s objective was to execute a swift military operation to quickly achieve a strategic goal. However, only now, after nearly three years of fighting, does it seem that this goal was to conquer and militarily control that portion of the Donbas—including the areas housing the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, parts of the Zaporizhia region, and, of course, the territory south of Kherson (namely, the left bank of the Dnieper Delta, which provides land access to the Crimean Peninsula).
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, from Russia’s perspective, the conflict’s evolution was aimed at achieving this objective—even though the initial phase of the Russian intervention resembled not so much the start of a large-scale armed conflict on a sovereign state’s territory as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops or the bloody Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that, after reaching the border of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Russian troops halted their offensive and entered an “operational pause”—presumably to regroup and concentrate forces for further consolidation of their control over the captured territory. Paradoxically, this pause enabled the Ukrainian army to consolidate its positions, rapidly regroup in unexpected locations where enemy vulnerabilities were exposed, and push back Russian forces in the north and northeast.
A major turning point was expected with the Ukrainian counter-offensive planned for late spring and early summer 2023. However, the counter-offensive quickly lost momentum due to robust Russian defensive lines—especially along the southern part of the front—and Ukraine’s insufficient capability to launch a decisive attack. It soon became evident that the planned large-scale assaults by Ukrainian combined infantry and armored formations on heavily mined terrain, without overwhelming air support and artillery backing, were unlikely to succeed against Russian defenses. Furthermore, Russia’s moderate yet effective air superiority prevented Ukrainian forces from penetrating deep into Russian formations without additional support, forcing Ukrainian commanders to abandon their aggressive plans. In short, launching a counter-offensive without sufficient air and ground fire support proved to be a critical error. Although Ukraine made gains in certain areas, its primary objective—to split the territory occupied by Russian forces in the south and reach the Sea of Azov—remained elusive.
Another significant milestone in the conflict occurred with the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region in early August 2024. Ukraine managed to completely surprise Russian forces, advancing several dozen kilometers into Kursk during the initial days of the operation. It is likely that Ukraine’s intent was to alleviate military pressure in the southern and eastern parts of the country, where Russian advances had been slow but steady. By launching an attack across a poorly defended border and occupying Russian territory, Ukrainian commanders believed they could force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from the Ukrainian front and redeploy them to defend Russia proper. Moreover, the offensive offered Ukraine a chance to reclaim the initiative after a year of costly and demoralizing defensive operations. However, this unexpected move near Kursk was less about territorial gains and more about setting the stage for a future resolution of the conflict; its outcome could well influence subsequent approaches to a peaceful settlement.
The deployment of North Korean troops in the Kursk region—and at other points along the front—proved to be sporadic and did not significantly impact the overall conflict. In practice, their ability to communicate and coordinate effectively with Russian units was extremely limited, even though North Korean military hardware is largely compatible with Russian equipment.
For a considerable time the front line remained relatively stable, and by securing key positions at Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Pokrovsk, the Russian army appears to have met its operational objectives. This current configuration undoubtedly favors Russia and will likely serve as the basis for negotiations over a new demarcation line between the two sides. The remaining question is what approach the Russian command will take regarding the portion of the Kursk region currently held by Ukrainian forces. At present, it does not appear that Russia is aggressively attempting to completely expel Ukrainian units from this area, and the current Ukrainian positions offer little hope that the Kursk salient will become a major bargaining chip in territorial negotiations.
A critical factor in the conflict’s future, however, is the shift in the political direction of the United States and the resulting implications for its foreign policy. Only time will tell whether a potential peace plan from the new American administration will influence the war’s outcome and shape the post-war geopolitical landscape. Ultimately, the situation on the battlefield merely sets the stage for political negotiations, and any battlefield advantage is only one of many factors that will determine the framework for discussions on the region’s future.
Author: Ing. Zdeněk Petráš, Ph.D.
