Zdeněk Petráš, Ph.D., from the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, comments in his article on recent operations conducted by Ukraine and Israel deep within enemy territory. According to the author, how these operations were carried out can be interpreted not only as an innovative response to a growing or existing threat from the adversary but also as proof of the timeless validity of Clausewitz’s classical theory of war. Although both operations feature modern elements such as drone usage, cyber disruption, and covert infiltration, the core principles of Clausewitz’s work remain applicable in contemporary conflicts.
Ukraine and Israel: Similarities in Operations on Enemy Territory
It is a widely known fact that Clausewitz defined war as a continuation of politics by other means. Both Ukraine and Israel have conducted and continue to conduct operations with clear political objectives: for Ukraine, the defense of its sovereignty and prevention of Russian domination; for Israel, the aim is to prevent the Iranian nuclear threat. These operations are not isolated military acts but rather means of achieving strategic goals aligned with broader political interests. According to Clausewitz, efforts in war should focus on the enemy’s center of gravity – their main source of power. Ukrainian strikes on strategic air bases and Israel’s targeting of facilities linked to Iran’s nuclear program precisely reflect this logic — attacking the physical center of gravity of the adversary’s forces. The goal was to hit the enemy at points whose loss would significantly reduce their ability to conduct the conflict.
Military operations conducted by Israel against Iran and by Ukraine against Russia show striking similarities in the application of warfare principles. Above all, both reflect a sophisticated approach to asymmetric conflict, employing covert infiltration, advanced technologies, and the element of surprise to maximize operational impact. Both operations made extensive use of covert infiltration to position assets near high-value targets. In the case of Ukrainian attacks on Russian air bases, drones were smuggled into Russia and transported in civilian trucks to locations near military installations. These drones were then remotely activated to strike strategic bombers and other assets. Similarly, Israel’s operation against Iran reportedly involved Mossad agents infiltrating the country to deploy jamming systems, anti-air defenses disarmament devices, and kamikaze drones near Iranian military bases and nuclear facilities. This pre-positioning enabled both actors to circumvent robust air defence systems and achieve tactical surprise — a key factor in breaching fortified targets.
Both operations used relatively inexpensive technologies to achieve their operational objectives. Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web” employed low-cost drones — some worth less than $1,000 — aimed at destroying Russian strategic bombers or early warning aircraft. The operation caused significant material damage and deprived Russia’s air force of a third of its strategic bombers capable of launching long-range cruise missiles against targets in Ukraine from Russian airspace. The significance of this strike is comparable to other major military successes since the Russian invasion, including the sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Moskva, the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, and the missile attack on the Sevastopol port.
Likewise, Israel used combat drones and precision-guided munitions to neutralize Iranian surface-to-air missile systems and destroy stockpiles of smart munitions, thereby weakening Iran’s defensive capabilities and ability to respond quickly. The use of drones and electronic warfare systems highlights the shift toward cost-effective technologies that fundamentally challenge conventional principles of warfare that emphasize overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority in military hardware.
Furthermore, the target selection in both operations underscores the importance of eliminating critical strategic capabilities. Ukrainian strikes focused on Russian air bases with nuclear bombers and aircraft equipped with modern surveillance and monitoring systems, significantly impairing Russia’s ability to deploy its air forces and coordinate air operations. In contrast, Israeli strikes targeted Iranian military bases, missile and ballistic missile storage facilities, and, most importantly, infrastructure related to the development and production of nuclear weapons, aiming to weaken Iran’s defensive position and deter its ambitions to use nuclear weapons against Israel. Both operations primarily aimed to destroy or damage irreplaceable assets and infrastructure, thereby amplifying the long-term impact of the strikes.
Another significant element in applying the principles of warfare was the use of surprise. In this context, surprise served to counter the numerical and technological superiority of the adversaries. In Ukraine’s case, Russian defenses were caught off guard by the deployment of numerous drones in coordinated attacks across multiple regions, with some strikes reaching as far as Siberia. Israel’s operation similarly used covertly placed assets to disrupt Iranian air defenses prior to launching airstrikes, allowing Israeli aircraft to operate with reduced risk. The strikes mainly targeted key command structures and medium- and long-range ballistic missile sites. The June 12 attack, conducted with the element of surprise, weakened Iran’s ability to respond forcefully and created space for a broader aerial operation, which the United States later used to launch a large-scale strike on Iranian facilities related to nuclear weapons development and production. This approach — relying on infiltration and low-cost technologies — enabled both countries to strike far beyond their borders at opponents who were, at the given time and location, more numerous and better equipped.
Both operations demonstrated careful planning and a high degree of logistical coordination. Ukraine’s operation, planned over 18 months, involved covert transportation of drones across borders, their precise placement, and carefully timed deployment. Israel’s operation required assembling and deploying advanced systems in Iran, likely involving months of intelligence gathering and analysis alongside the infiltration of Mossad agents. Moreover, the use of civilian infrastructure and vehicles — such as cargo trucks — to transport and conceal military equipment emphasizes the complexity of these operations and the necessity of unconventional and nonstandard approaches.
These two operations underscore the growing role of drones, electronic warfare, and covert subversive actions in modern conflicts. The ability to strike deep into enemy territory using inexpensive and hard-to-detect tools significantly reshapes traditional approaches to achieving major strategic goals, especially for smaller countries disadvantaged by their economic situation or geographical position. On the other hand, this also reveals that the vulnerability to such types of attacks increases the need to improve the protection not only of military facilities but of all critical infrastructure against drones and other unmanned systems. The penetration of Ukrainian drones into Russian territory, thousands of kilometers from the front line, represents a major shift compared to previous tactical attacks launched from Ukrainian territory over short distances. This may not only highlight Russia’s limited ability to secure its strategically important sites but also suggest that full protection of such facilities — especially those deep within a country — is practically impossible. Similarly, Iran’s failure to detect Mossad infiltration and drone deployment highlights gaps in its defensive architecture. These lessons are particularly relevant for great powers like the United States, whose air bases in the Pacific and the Middle East face similar threats from adversaries such as China.
The technological sophistication of the drones and jamming systems used by Ukraine and Israel was likely based on components or expertise provided by the West. Ukrainian drones, for example, featured advanced artificial intelligence and navigation systems, while the Israeli operation required precise intelligence and top-tier electronic warfare capabilities. The striking similarities between the Israeli attack on Iran and Ukrainian strikes on Russian air bases reflect a common principle of warfare characterized by covert infiltration, low-cost technology, and strategic surprise.
Although Clausewitz’s theory originated during an era of exclusively conventional warfare, its universality allows for application to partial operations as well. Both operations demonstrate that key principles of war — the relationship between politics and war, the importance of morale, the rise of uncertainty, and the effort to disrupt the adversary’s center of gravity — remain relevant. Ukraine’s and Israel’s successful operations prove that even smaller-scale actions can have a significant effect on the overall outcome of a conflict.
An analysis of Ukrainian and Israeli operations shows that despite changes in the nature of warfare, the fundamental principles of combat and theories of war remain valid. Understanding theoretical approaches to warfare — not only from Clausewitz but also from other renowned theorists — helps provide deeper insight into the motivations, execution, and dynamics of even the most modern and technologically sophisticated military operations of the 21st century. This applies fully to the course of the war in Ukraine.
Author: Zdeněk Petráš, Ph.D.
